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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Alvarez family and the rest of the sellout crowd attending
the Mariners game cheered wildly as Ken Griffey, Jr. swung at the
fastball, sending it flying out of the ballpark. This game meant a lot to
Roberto Alvarez, it being his first ever at an outside, open-air professional baseball park in his forty-five years as a resident of King County.1 He had planned to take his family to see this game for a long time,
saving money by working overtime as a truck driver. However,
between the cost of the concessions and the ticket prices, he seriously
doubted that he would be able to buy his family a night out at a Mariners game again soon. 2 Nevertheless, he was enjoying this game in the
new stadium, watching home runs being hit in the dimming lights of a
beautiful Puget Sound sunset.
As a King County resident, Roberto should enjoy the game as
well as the new stadium. After all, he has been paying for the stadium
since 1995, when the Washington State Legislature passed the Stadium Act to ensure the continued viability of major league baseball as an

* J.D. Candidate 2000, Seattle University School of Law; B.A. 1994, University of Washington. The author would like to thank the Law Review editorial committee for their insightful suggestions and hard work on this article. Thanks also to "the Pool," my family, and the legal writing
staff of the law school. Finally, the author wishes to thank his wife, Jill, for her love and support.
1. The Alvarez family and Roberto Alvarez are fictional characters and are not intended to
bear any resemblance to any persons either living or dead. Ken Griffey, Jr. is a major league
baseball player who plays center field for the Seattle Mariners, a professional major league baseball team in Seattle, Washington. The new baseball stadium in Seattle opened in July 1999, and
has been named Safeco Field.
2. According to Seattle Times sports writer Tom Fuller, baseball ticket prices in the new
stadium range from $5-7 in the outfield bleachers, to $13-16 along the foul baselines, on up to
$100-195 for seats behind home plate. Telephone Interview with Tom Fuller, November 29,
1998.
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institution in Seattle.3 The Stadium Act imposed an additional
0.017% sales and use tax on all King County residents for construction
of a new baseball stadium for the Seattle Mariners.4 Only weeks
before the Act's passage, King County voters rejected the same proposed tax in a countywide referendum.' Nevertheless, following the
Act's passage, the King County Council authorized the creation of a
public facilities district to implement the tax, among other things.
Soon thereafter the construction of the new Mariners stadium began.6
The Washington Legislature's passage of the Stadium Act in
1995 was the culmination of a series of financial development arrangements between state and local governments and private entities.
Indeed, 1995 proved to be a remarkable year for such arrangements, as
evidenced by much publicized deals like the Pacific Place parking
3. Stadium Act, 1995-1996 Wash. Laws, 3rd Spec. Sess., ch. 1 et seq. declared as an emergency. Section 310 of the Stadium Act provides: "This Act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, or support of the state government and its existing
public institutions, and shall take effect immediately." Stadium Act § 310 at 13.
4. The Stadium Act was first proposed by Representatives Van Leuven and Appelwick as
Engrossed House Bill 2115, 3rd Spec. Sess. (Wash. 1995), which was adopted as the Stadium Act
by Washington's legislature on October 17, 1995. See Stadium Act § 310 ch. 13. The Act provides legislative authority for the creation of a public facilities district to implement a sales and
use tax of 0.017% in a county with a population of one million or more. The Act also allows the
public facilities district to impose taxes on retail sales of food and beverages by restaurants, taverns, and bars, and to impose special sales taxes on car rentals. The state is further authorized to
generate revenues for the stadium's construction through the sale of sports and stadium related
license plates and lottery scratch tickets with sports themes. See Stadium Act §§ 101, 103, 104,
201, and 202.
5. This referendum was authorized by the Washington legislature and allowed King County to impose a tax for purposes of constructing a new stadium only upon voter approval. See
Financing of Public Stadiums Used by Professional Sports Teams, 1995 Wash. Laws, 1st Spec.
Sess., ch. 14, §§ 6 and 7 at 2381. The referendum was in response to Seattle Mariners management concerns about the continued financial viability of baseball in Seattle. Immediately following the voters' rejection of the referendum and tax, the Mariners threatened to put their team
up for sale on October 30, 1995, unless King County provided them with a new retractable roof
stadium, modeled closely after Toronto's Skydome. In response to this threat, Governor Mike
Lowry called the legislature into a special session on October 11, 1995. This session discussed
stadium financing, and led to the consideration and ultimate passage of Engrossed House Bill
2115, 3rd Spec. Sess., which was declared a legislative emergency. See supra note 4. Subsequent
attempts to repeal the Stadium Act through the referendum process were rebutted due to the
Act's emergent nature. See Citizens for Leaders with Ethics and Accountability Now (CLEAN)
v. State, 130 Wash. 2d 782, 787-88, 812, 928 P.2d 1054, 1057, 1068 (1997). CLEAN is a
Washington state nonprofit organization dedicated to promoting effective grassroots citizen educational campaigns. CLEAN Homepage (visited Nov. 15, 1998) <http://www.clean.org/>.
6. The King County Council enacted Ordinance 12000 on October 25, 1995, which created
the Washington State Major League Baseball Stadium Public Facilities District to impose the
three special sales and use taxes authorized under the Stadium Act. See King County v. Taxpayers of King County, 133 Wash. 2d 584, 590, 949 P.2d 1260, 1263 (1997); Citizens for More
Important Things v. King County, 131 Wash. 2d 411, 932 P.2d 135 (1997) (holding that Ordinance 12000 did not violate state constitutional provisions against levying taxes for a public
purpose).
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garage in downtown Seattle and the River Park Square in downtown
Spokane. Like the Mariners stadium, both of these projects were
largely financed with public money lent to private corporate interests,
despite a state constitutional ban on such loans.7
As part of a growing national trend, these public-private arrangements, often called "partnerships," are touted as benefiting the local
economies they serve, while at the same time providing private companies and entities a necessary means of financing development projects that would otherwise be unfunded. Yet, despite their assumed or
actual benefits, these partnerships have recently come under increased
public scrutiny, both nationally and in Washington. 9
The increased public scrutiny in Washington primarily derives
from the Washington Constitution's prohibition on government gifting of public funds or extending credit to corporations.'" Because of
such prohibitions, many public-private partnerships have developed
creative procedural and substantive legal mechanisms to serve their
financing needs while avoiding constitutional scrutiny.
Procedural mechanisms, such as creating public corporations for
7. See infra note 10. For a discussion of the Nordstrom parking garage, see Barbara A. Serrano and Deborah Nelson, City Overpaid Pine Street Developer, SEATTLE TIMES, December 21,
1997, at Al. For a discussion of the Spokane Riverview Mall development, see Citizens for
Leaders with Ethics and Accountability Now (CLEAN) v. Spokane, 133 Wash. 2d 455, 460, 947
P.2d 1169, 1171 (1997), cert. denied 119 S. Ct. 45 (1998).
8. See, e.g., Dale F. Rubin, Public Purpose in the Northwest: A Sinkhole ofJudicialInterpretation, 32 IDAHO L. REV. 417 (1996); Judith Welch Wagner, Utopian Visions: Cooperation
Without Conflicts in Public-Private Ventures, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 313 (1991); Tim W.
Ferguson, Do Fancy Shopping Malls Deserve Public Subsidies?, FORBES, April 20, 1998, at 42;
William Fulton, Wonder Where All Thot Downtown Development Money Went? Look in the Parking Garage, GOVERNING MAGAZINE, August 1998, at 25. These partnerships have little to do
with traditional partnership law, and should not be considered partnerships in the legal sense of
the term. See generally J. CRANE AND A. BROMBERG, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP, 189-95 (1968). Public-private partnerships are also not necessarily always clearly defined.
For example, a form of constructive partnership develops whenever public funds are used to
benefit private concerns, even if such benefit is incidental to the broader public purpose.
9. See Donald L. Barlett and James B. Steele, Corporate Welfare, TIME MAGAZINE,
November 9, 1998, at 34; Dale F. Rubin, Public Subsidies to PrivateCorporations and the Washington State Constitution, WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES, 1997 (visited March
13, 1998) <http://www.wips.org/rubin.htm>.
10. Two sections of article VIII of the Washington Constitution govern the restriction of
government lending of public funds to corporations. Section 5 provides: "The credit of the state
shall not, in any manner be given or loaned to, or in aid of, any individual, association, company
or corporation." WA. CONST. art. VIII, § 5.
§ 7 provides:
No county, city, town or other municipal corporation shall hereafter give any money,
or property, or loan its money, or credit to or in aid of any individual, association,
company or corporation, except for the necessary support of the poor and infirm, or
become directly or indirectly the owner of any stock in or bonds of any association,
company, or corporation.
WA CONST. art. VIII, § 7.
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channeling public funds to establish a public purpose for financing,11
utilizing Federal Housing and Urban Development loans to avoid
public scrutiny, 12 declaring development projects to be public emergencies to avoid the referendum process constitutionally guaranteed
the public,13 and granting a wide variety of tax subsidies to private
corporations,14 have effectively shut the taxpaying public out of the
debate over how their tax dollars are spent, and spawned numerous
lawsuits. S
Substantive mechanisms used by courts to determine the constitutional validity of development projects, such as whether public
expenditures to private entities serve a fundamental governmental
11. See WASH. REV. CODE § 35.21.730 (1998), which provides:
[T]o improve the administration of authorized federal grants or programs, to improve
governmental efficiency and services, or to improve the general living conditions in
the urban areas of the state, any city, town, or county may by lawfully adopted ordinance or resolution:
(1) Transfer to any public corporation, commission or authority created hereunder, with or without consideration, any funds, real or personal property,
property interests, or services;
(4) Create public corporations, commissions, and authorities to: Administer
and execute federal grants or programs; receive and administer private funds,
goods, or services for any lawful public purpose; and perform any lawful
public purpose or public function....
12. See 24 C.F.R. § 570.703 (1994) (enabling the Federal Housing and Urban Development Department (HUD) to make community block grants to local governments for purposes of
economic development); See also WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.310(r) (1998) (exempting from
public disclosure "[flinancial and commercial information and records supplied by businesses or
individuals.., during application for economic development loans or program services provided
by any local agency.").
13. The Washington Constitution art. II, section 1 (amend. 72) affords the people the right
to referendum and provides:
The legislative authority of the state of Washington shall be vested in the legislature .... but the people reserve to themselves the power to propose bills, laws, and to
enact or reject the same at the polls, independent of the legislature, and also reserve
power, at their own option, to approve or reject at the polls any act, item, section, or
part of any bill, act or law passed by the legislature.
(b) Referendum. The second power reserved by the people is the referendum, and it
may be ordered on any act, bill, law, or any part thereof passed by the legislature,
except such laws as may be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public
peace, health or safety, [or] support of the state government and its existing public
institutions. ...
WA CONST. art. II, § 1.
14. Article VII, section 1 of the Washington Constitution provides that all taxes imposed
"shall be levied and collected for public purposes only." WA. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
15. See, e.g., CLEAN v. State, 130 Wash. 2d 782, 928 P.2d 1054 (1997); King County v.
Taxpayers of King County, 133 Wash. 2d 584, 949 P.2d 260 (1997); Citizens for More Important Things v. King County, 131 Wash. 2d 411, 932 P.2d 135 (1997); CLEAN v. City of Spokane, 133 Wash. 2d 455, 947 P.2d 1169 (1997).
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purpose and whether sufficient consideration exists in public
exchanges of capital, only serve to further the public's nonparticipation. 6 Moreover, given the recent zeal of state and local governments
for entering public-private financing arrangements, and the Washington Supreme Court's failure to adequately address the problems
created by these arrangements, it is likely that more lawsuits will be
brought in the future. 7 The result of state and local government use
of such mechanisms raises an important question: What is the proper
role of public-private development?
This Comment explores this question by examining the legal
mechanisms used in public-private financing arrangements in light of
three recent public-private development projects in Washington: the
Mariners stadium in Seattle, the River Park Square development in
Spokane, and the Pacific Place parking garage in Seattle. These projects utilized a combination of legal mechanisms that allowed state and
local governments to foster economic development and benefit private
entities by circumventing the constitutional ban on the gifting of
funds, despite widespread public opposition to the development.
This Comment argues that while the public may ultimately
benefit economically from public-private partnership development,
the legal mechanisms used in public-private partnerships to skirt the
constitution violate the public trust by (1) precluding the public from
obtaining information regarding these projects; (2) denying the taxpaying public their right to participate in public choices and spending
decisions that affect them; and (3) severely impinging on the public's
state constitutional right to the referendum process. Furthermore, by
allowing these mechanisms to exist, the Washington Supreme Court
only furthers the violation of the public's trust, while simultaneously
weakening the role of the judiciary as a guardian of the democratic
process. Because of the court's complicity, the only way much-needed
reform will be achieved is through a well-educated state legislature
that is more responsive to the majority of its constituency.
This Comment begins Part II with a historical analysis of the rise
of public-private partnerships in Washington and how that rise corresponded to the development of the Washington Constitution's prohibition of the gifting of public funds or lending of credit to corporations. Part II also includes an analysis of how the Washington
Supreme Court has interpreted these constitutional provisions since
16. See City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of City of Tacoma, 108 Wash. 2d 679, 743 P.2d 793
(1987); see also Adams v. University of Washington, 106 Wash. 2d 312, 722 P.2d 74 (1986).
17. At the time of this publication one suit is already pending. See CLEAN v. City of
Seattle, No. 98-2-09656-0SEA, trial pending Nov. 15, 1999 (King County Sup. Ct. 1998).
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their development.
Part III illustrates the modern mechanisms of public-private
financing vis-A-vis Washington's constitutional prohibitions by examthe
ining three recent public-private partnership developments:
Seattle Mariners stadium development, the River Park Square parking
garage development in Spokane, and the Pacific Place development in
downtown Seattle. Case studies illustrate the role of the Washington
Supreme Court in facilitating such arrangements and allowing the
financing mechanisms used in the arrangements to exist, despite the
apparent conflict with the state constitution.
Part IV suggests the proper role of public-private partnerships in
Washington. Furthermore, this section discusses how this area of law
could be reformed by eliminating the constitutional proscription on
public funding, implementing greater procedural safeguards, limiting
the use of public-private partnerships, adopting a corporate model,
better defining, or eliminating emergency clauses.

II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE FINANCING
ARRANGEMENTS IN WASHINGTON

The first public-private partnership arrangements in Washington began with the advent of the national railroad system in the late
nineteenth century. Like many other states desiring railroad access for
purposes of trade and transportation, Washington entered into agreements with private railroad corporations to subsidize railroad development with public funds."i Such subsidies often involved direct
payments of cash and municipal bonds or loans of credit to railroad
corporations. 9 Despite the public nature of the loans, the public had
little control over the marketing of the loans or the allocation of their
taxpaying dollars. Railroad corporations receiving loan proceeds often
sold the bonds issued to them in eastern markets at below market
prices.2 ° Moreover, many railroad lines financed by public funds were
never built, and those that were built were often abandoned in
response to changing markets or radical financial mismanagement by
railroad monopolies.2 As a result, many states incurred substantial
18. David E. Pinsky, State Constitutional Limitations on Public Industrial Financing: An
Historicaland Economic Approach, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 265,277-80 (1963).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. The enormity of the extortion carried on by and through our railroads is hard to conceive.., the evils that have grown up around the building and operation of our railroads
cannot easily be uncovered. The injustice of discrimination in freight charges and transportation service, the wrong of charging those who are outside of the railroad cliques higher
rates than those who are within them... is impossible to show in all its atrocity....
WHARTON BAKER, THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW 717 (1906).
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financial hardship, with some states approaching near bankruptcy.22
In reaction to Washington's own public indebtedness from railroad subsidies, and as a "protection from enemies without and the
protection of weak from the strong within," Washington enacted article VIII, sections 5 and 7 at the Constitutional Convention of 1889.23
These provisions severely curtailed the ability of state and local governments to lend or give money to private entities and prohibited the
public ownership of stock.24
The framers of the constitution feared the potential negative
impact on the public if assets were given or lent to private entities.
Furthermore, the transfer of public assets to private entities was considered an improper function of government, if not a detriment to
government and private industry in general.2" Provisions similar to
Washington's article VIII, sections 5 and 7 were included in many
states' constitutions across the nation; and, eventually, the frenetic
pace of public subsidies to railroads quieted.26
Ironically, many of the same concerns which gave rise to article
VIII, sections 5 and 7 are expressed in the briefs of litigants opposed
to public-private partnerships today. These modern concerns are a
direct result of a gradual erosion of Washington's constitutional proscriptions over the past century. The following two sections examine
this erosion.
A. Court's Strict Adherence to Framers'Intent
In the first half of this century, the Washington Supreme Court
interpreted the language of sections 5 and 7 almost literally.27 In Seat22. Pinsky, supra note 18, at 280-81.
23. Comments of delegate Buchanan at the Constitutional Convention of 1889, printed in
Colin Kippen, Article VIII, Sections 5 and 7: An Examinationof the Provisions, Their Impact and
the Prospectsfor Change, SEATTLE CITY LIGHT, April 18, 1979, at 1-8. For the text of the
constitutional provisions please see supranote 10.
24. Article VII, Section 1, was enacted in 1930 and provides: "The power of taxation shall
never be suspended, surrendered or contracted away. All taxes shall be uniform upon the same
class of property within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax and shall be levied
and collected for public purposes only... " WA. CONST. art. VII, § 1. This essentially set up
the public purpose doctrine originally enacted in Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147
(1853); see Rubin, supra note 9.
25. Kippen, supra note 23, at 1-9-10.
26. Pinsky, supra note 18, at 282-89; see, e.g., OR. CONST. art XI, § 9; IDAHO CONST. art.
VIII,

§ 4; CAL.

CONST. art. XVI, § 6.

27. See supra note 10 (text of §§ 5 and 7). Sections 5 and 7 are frequently considered synonymous in Washington opinions, with courts construing the two sections to contain similar
"prohibitions and exceptions" despite their different language. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of
City of Tacoma, 108 Wash. 2d 679, 701, 743 P.2d 793, 804 (1987). See also Health Care Facilities v. Ray, 93 Wash. 2d 108, 115-16, 605 P.2d 1260, 1264 (1980); Kippen, supra note 23, at I11-17.
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tle and Lake Washington Waterway Co. v. Seattle Dock Co.,28 one of
the court's earlier cases involving public-private financing arrangements, the court upheld a state contract with a private dredging contractor to dredge a waterway and deposit the dredging material on
state-owned tidal land. 29 The state's payment under the contract was
made by attaching a lien to the state-owned property that would be
paid off upon purchase of the property. 30 Interpreting the plain language definition of lending of credit as correlative to the incurring of a
financial obligation or debt, the court found no lending of credit
because the state incurred no debt in exercising a lien."
Next, in Johns v. Wadsworth,3 2 one of the court's first cases concerning section 5's ban on the public gifting of funds to private entities, the court invalidated a county's loan of public money to a private
corporation for purposes of sponsoring an agricultural fair.33 Interpreting the framers' intent literally, the court held that "all gifts of
money, property, or credit to ... any corporation" violates the gift
provision of section 5.34 Yet, as urban economies grew, so did the
apparent need for public capital to finance urban development projects
and transportation. 5
Responding to these pressures, the Washington Supreme Court
began to carve out exceptions to its otherwise strict interpretation of
constitutional prohibitions against public subsidies where an enterprise could prove that its functions were public in nature.36 The
growth of public-private partnerships followed closely behind, encouraged by loosened constitutional constraints on their development.
Thus, in 1963, in Miller v. City of Tacoma,3 7 the court rejected a
challenge to the City of Tacoma's plan to redevelop blighted urban
condemnation and reselling
areas by purchasing blighted land through
it to private development entities. 38 Although section 7 clearly pro-

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

35 Wash. 503, 77 P. 845 (1904), aff'd, 195 U.S. 624.
Id.
Id. at 515, 77 P. at 848.
Id.
80 Wash. 352, 141 P. 892 (1914).

33.

Id. at 354, 141 P. at 893.

34. Id.
35.

Kippen, supra note 23, at 1-9.

36. See State v. Guaranty Trust Co. of Yakima, 20 Wash. 2d 588, 591-92, 148 P.2d 323,
325 (1942) (finding state funds used in support of needy persons in a nursing home to be a recog-

nized public function exempt from constitutional restrictions); Rands v. Clark County, 79 Wash.
152, 157, 139 P. 1090, 1092 (1914) (finding that entities whose functions are public in nature are
exempt); Paine v. Port of Seattle, 70 Wash. 294, 322-23, 126 P. 628, 635 (1912) (finding that a
lease by the port to a private party was justified because the port retained power to regulate).

37. 61 Wash. 2d 374, 378 P.2d 464 (1963).
38. Id. at 387-88, 378 P.2d at 472.
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vides that no city shall give or lend its credit in any manner to any
individual or company, the court found a broad public purpose exception to Washington's ban on the gifting of public funds.3 9
The court reasoned that any benefit conferred upon private interests by Tacoma in the resale of condemned property was incidental to
the overall public purpose envisioned by Tacoma in its community
development goals.4" The court justified its position by stating that as
"governmental activities increase with the growing complexity
and
integration of society, the concept of 'public use' naturally expands in
proportion."41 Miller's "incidental private benefit" analysis was a
broad departure from the court's traditional view of article VIII's prohibitions and serves as an important substantive legal mechanism in
avoiding constitutional proscription in modern public-private financing arrangements.4 2
This judicial erosion of section 7's ban on lending public credit
to private entities continued in Berglund v. City of Tacoma.43 In Berglund, the Washington Supreme Court found that a loan of credit by
the City of Tacoma to a local improvement district for purposes of
expanding water services outside of the city was not a violation of article VIII, section 7 because Tacoma would become the ultimate owner
of the expanded water services.44 In allowing Tacoma to make its loan
to the district, the court effectively recognized an additional public
purpose or control exception to section 7's prohibitions against the
45
municipal lending of public credit to private entities.
4
6
Anderson v. O'Brien continued this broad interpretation and set
the stage for the court's modern interpretation of article VIII's provisions. 47 In Anderson, the court again held that a state statute authorizing the gift of public funds to a local Native American tribe was

39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 384-85, 378 P.2d at 470.
42. See discussion infra Part III.
43. 70 Wash. 2d 475, 423 P.2d 922 (1967).
44. Id. at 478, 423 P.2d at 925-26.
45. The Berglund opinion fits well within the purposes behind the enactment of section 7
despite its exception. By establishing that the City of Tacoma owned the property, the court
effectively negated any risk of loss to public funds, while benefiting the city "rather than the property of private individuals." See Kippen, supra note 23 at IV-16; see also Gruen v. State Tax
Comm'n, 35 Wash. 2d 1, 30-31, 211 P.2d 651, 668-69 (1949) (where the court found a public
purpose exception for a tax imposed on cigarettes for purposes of retiring bonds which benefited
veterans) (overruled by State ex rel. Fin. Comm'n v. Martin, 62 Wash. 2d 645, 384 P.2d 833
(1963)).
46. 84 Wash. 2d 64, 524 P.2d 390 (1974).
47. Id. at 66, 524 P.2d at 393.
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within the public purpose exception to article VIII section 5.48 The
funds authorized by the statute were made for the purpose of con49
structing buildings to lease to private manufacturing firms. Reiterating its opinion in Miller, the court reasoned that where a private
corporation's functions are "wholly public" there is no constitutional
violation of section 5, despite the incidental benefit to the private sector."0
Essentially, Anderson found that the public appropriations were
not outright gifts within the purview of section 5 because they were
public expenditures for which the public received consideration in the
form of public benefits."1 Furthermore, Anderson reinforced what
would become another modern mechanism of public financing that
benefits private concerns: the use of a quasi-public agency to manage
the financing program. This allowed the public to retain adequate
control over the program while evading the constitutional proscription
of sections 5 and 752
As will be seen in the next section, the combination of Anderson's
consideration analysis, Miller's "incidental private benefit" analysis,
and the court's acceptance of the use of public agencies as finance
managers set the modern stage for the court's determination of whether a public appropriation was violative of article VIII, sections 5 and
7. These more flexible approaches to the question of whether the use
of public money benefited the public facilitated the increased development of public-private entities, and legitimized their existence
despite their proscription under Washington's constitution.

48. Id.
49. Id. at 68, 524 P.2d at 393.
50. Id. Under the court's analysis, "wholly public" referred to the types of construction
authorized under the statute, which included sewers, roads, bridges, waste material sites, and
water distribution facilities. The court also made reference to article VII, section 1 of the Washington Constitution, which provides that all taxes "shall be levied and collected for public purposes only .... " Id.; see supra note 14.
51. The consideration the public received was the elimination of unemployment problems
on Native American reservations which the statute was targeted towards ameliorating. Id. at 70,
524 P.2d at 394. The incidental private benefit received by the private building contractors was
essential to achieving the broader public purpose, and thus an acceptable exception to Washington's constitutional prohibitions.
52. The creation of public or quasi-public entities was licensed by the United States
Supreme Court in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). See also United States v. Town of
North Bonneville, 94 Wash. 2d 827, 835, 621 P.2d 127, 131 (1980); Miller, 61 Wash. 2d 374,
388-89, 378 P.2d 464, 473 (1963). The creation of public or quasi-public authorities as development conduits would become an often-used tool in the creation of public-private financing. If
the development is controlled by a public entity, there can be no argument that it is within the
public, and not the private interest. Setting up a quasi-public authority is within the scope of a
local government's power under chapter 3 5.21 of the Revised Code of Washington.
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Washington's modern legitimization of public-private partnerships began in 1986 with the Washington Supreme Court's opinion in
Adams v. University of Washington. 3 Adams involved a group of
female University of Washington employees who sued the state to
enforce the state's equal pay statute.54 The female employees were
paid less than their male counterparts for performing similar work.
The employees claimed that the difference paid to the males was an
unconstitutional gift of public funds under article VIII, section 5.S'
In holding unanimously that no public gift of funds occurred, the
court established the foundation of modern article VIII interpretation:
whether an unconstitutional gift occurred depended on whether there
was a decrease in the state general fund and a lack of sufficient "consideration."56 The consideration in question was couched in contract
terms as an "act or forbearance which has been bargained for." 7 The
court viewed this consideration in terms of the public's exchange of its
tax dollars, in the 8form of government spending, for the public's
5
receipt of a benefit.
Thus, if the public did not receive anything in exchange for the
government's use of public tax dollars, the government would be violating article VIII. The existence of consideration provided the court
with evidence that no gift existed because "a gift is a transfer of property without consideration and with donative intent." 9 Adams laid
down the rule that unless gift elements such as donative intent or a
grossly inadequate return were proven by the challengers to a use of
public funds, the court would not inquire into the adequacy or amount
of consideration.6" The court found sufficient consideration because
the physically superior skills of the male employees were used on
53. 106 Wash. 2d 312, 722 P.2d 74 (1986).
54. Id. at 313, 722 P.2d at 75.
55. Id. at 326-27, 722 P.2d at 82. Both the men and the women were employed as printers
in the Department of Printing at the University of Washington.
56. Id. at 327-28, 722 P.2d at 82-83. See also Louthan v. King County, 94 Wash. 2d 422,
428-29, 617 P.2d 977, 981 (1980) (holding that a bond measure through which King County

raised money to obtain development rights on private land was not a gift because such rights
were consideration for payments).
57. 106 Wash. 2d at 327, 722 P.2d at 82 (citing Huberdeau v. Desmariais, 79 Wash. 2d
432, 439-40, 486 P.2d 1074 (1971)).

58. Id.
59. Id. (citing General Tel. Co. of the Northwest, Inc. v. Bothell, 105 Wash. 2d 579, 58788, 716 P.2d 879 (1986)).
60. 106 Wash. 2d at 327, 722 P.2d at 82-83. See also City of Bellevue v. State, 92 Wash.
2d 717, 721, 600 P.2d 1268, 1270 (1979) (holding that reimbursement of Bellevue city employees
for tips paid is not a violation of section 5 because such reimbursement constituted consideration
for services rendered and no donative intent was present).
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occasion to justify the state's payment of higher wages."
The significance of the Adams consideration test was that any
public expenditure could potentially be seen as enough to justify a
declaration of constitutional validity if there was any finding of consideration, whether the expenditure directly benefited private entities
or not. Furthermore, since the court failed to address tax consequences in its public donation analysis, a public donation could occur
through the use of taxpayer money without depleting the state's general fund at all, by the receipt of nominal consideration. Thus, the
court ignored its previous one hundred years of strict constitutional
interpretation and specific historical exceptions to the patent ban on
the gifting of public funds to private entities.
The Adams model of article VIII interpretation was further
solidified one year later in City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of City of
Tacoma.62 Taxpayers involved a City of Tacoma electricity conservation program in which the city paid ratepayers to install approved
equipment to lessen city energy consumption.63 Finding that the city's
program did not violate the constitutional ban on government's gifting
of public funds to private individuals, the court utilized a two-part test
derived from past opinions and the Adams consideration analysis.
As a threshold question, the court asked whether Tacoma's program served a fundamental government purpose. 4 If a fundamental
government purpose existed, no further test was necessary as there
was an exception to article VIII's prohibitions. If no government purpose existed, the court asked whether there was sufficient consideration for Tacoma's payment. If sufficient consideration did not exist,
the question became whether there was any donative intent evidencing
a gift.6 5
In holding that Tacoma's interest was merely proprietary, the
court reasoned that Tacoma's expenditure was exchanged for sufficient consideration because Tacoma gained the benefit of saving
energy in exchange for the use of its public expenditure.66 Furthermore, as part of its consideration analysis, the court reiterated the
incidental private benefit analysis of Miller, stating: "Where the public receives sufficient consideration, and benefit to an individual is
61. 106 Wash. 2d at 327-28, 722 P.2d at 83.
62. 108 Wash. 2d 679, 743 P.2d 793 (1987).
63. Id. at 682-84, 743 P.2d at 795-96.
64. Id. at 702, 743 P.2d at 805. See also In re Marriage of Johnson, 96 Wash. 2d 255, 26162, 634 P.2d 877, 881 (1981) (first establishing that expenditures made for a recognized governmental function by means of a private benefit were exempt from article VIII's prohibitions).
65. 108 Wash. 2d at 703, 743 P.2d at 805-06 (citing Adams v. University of Washington,
106 Wash. 2d 312, 327, 722 P.2d 74, 82).
66. Id. at 704, 743 P.2d at 806.
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only incidental to and in aid of the public benefit, no unconstitutional
gift has occurred."67 In its analysis, the court focused on the sufficiency of consideration as opposed to the actual value of such consideration, finding that a measurement of the adequacy of consideration
would intrude upon a government's power to make its own legislative
judgments.68
Taxpayers' new analysis of whether a public expenditure to a private entity violates article VIII, sections 5 and 7 created a very important substantive legal mechanism for public-private partnerships to
utilize in circumventing the Washington Constitution. Under the
court's analysis of consideration, state and local governments have a
great discretion in creating public-private partnerships, which would
otherwise be unconstitutional under the plain language of sections 5
and 7.69 For example, a state or local government may establish the
existence of sufficient consideration, while at the same time, obfuscating that there may be facts indicative of a grossly inadequate return,
which would give rise to a donative intent.7 °
Nowhere can this better be seen than in three recent public-private financing arrangements: the Seattle Mariners' Safeco Field, the
River Park Square parking garage development in Spokane, and the
Pacific Place parking garage development in downtown Seattle. In
each of these cases, the Washington Supreme Court continues its consistent erosion of Washington's constitutional prohibitions by using
the same substantive legal mechanisms developed from Berglund
through Taxpayers. The following section will show that the court's
development of exceptions to the constitutional prohibitions has all
but eliminated the effect of the prohibitions and created an environment highly conducive to future development of public-private partnerships in Washington.
III. CASE STUDIES: HOW TO AVOID THE CONSTITUTION IN
PUBLIC-PRIVATE FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS

While not intended to be an instructional guide to local and state
governments or interested developers, the following cases illustrate
arguments public and private actors used in forming the financial
agreements supporting their partnerships. Indeed, if Safeco Field is
67. Id. at 705, 743 P.2d at 806.
68. Id. at 703, 743 P.2d at 805.
69. For an in-depth discussion of the issue of sufficiency of consideration versus adequacy
of consideration see David D. Martin, Washington State Constitutional Limitations on Gifting of
Funds to Private Enterprises: A Need for Reform, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 199 (1996).
70. See King County v. Taxpayers of King County, 133 Wash. 2d 584, 632-33, 949 P.2d
1260, 1284 (1997) (Sanders, J. dissenting).
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any indication, the future of public-private financial arrangements is
almost certain to prosper, unconstrained by sections 5 and 7.
A. A New Stadium, But At What Cost?
If one drives along Interstate Five just south of downtown Seattle, one can see both the old and new homes of the Seattle Mariners
baseball team. The old home is the Kingdome, which still hosts the
Seattle Seahawks football team and numerous recreational conventions. 71 The Mariners' new home is Safeco Field, a new baseball stadium built with state of the art technology, specifically designed as a
home field for the Seattle Mariners to keep them in Seattle.72
As previously mentioned, the stadium's construction was implemented by the passage of the Stadium Act in October of 1995.73 The
Act authorized the creation of a public facilities district in a county of
one million people or more and empowered the district to "acquire,
construct, own, remodel, maintain, equip, reequip, repair, and operate
a baseball stadium. '74 To finance the stadium's construction, the
district was authorized to implement a tax supplement to King County's sales and use tax, as well as a new tax on the food service industry
in King County. 75 To generate additional revenue, the district was
authorized to levy a tax on admission charges to stadium events and
sell special sports and stadium related automobile license plates.76
In addition to the public tax revenue, the Stadium Act allowed
the district to issue bonds "in an amount determined to be necessary
by the [district]" to finance the construction of the stadium. 77 As part
of the Act, the Seattle Mariners were required to contribute forty-five
71. The Mariners new stadium opened on July 15, 1999. Furthermore, the Kingdome itself is slated for eventual demolition, to be replaced by a new football stadium for the Seattle Seahawks, whose owners also threatened to leave Seattle unless a new stadium was built. See Brower
v. State, 137 Wash. 2d 44, 49, 969 P.2d 42, 47 (1998).
72. The Safeco insurance company bought the rights to name the new stadium Safeco Field
in 1998. See supra notes 4 and 5.
73. Stadium Act, 1995-1996 Wash. Laws, 3rd Spec. Sess., ch. 1 §§ 201(1) at 4, 201(4)(b) at
5. See supra notes 4 and 5.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Stadium Act § 201(3). The District requested a total of $336 million in limited tax general obligation bonds for the stadium's construction on January 2, 1997. The King County
Council approved the request on January 6, 1997. See Taxpayers of King County, 133 Wash. 2d
at 591, 949 P.2d at 1263-64. The ultimate construction and operation of the baseball stadium
was also contingent on a major league baseball team's contracting to play at least ninety percent
of its home games in the stadium. See Stadium Act § 201(4)(a). Notwithstanding the language
of the Act, the Act and the construction of a new baseball stadium were clearly designed for the
Seattle Mariners, and no other major league baseball team.
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million dollars for purposes of paying for preconstruction costs." To
seal the final aspects of their public-private partnership, the district
and the Seattle Mariners were also required to enter into an agreement
in which a portion of the profits generated by the Seattle Mariners
during their play season would be shared with the district to retire the
bonds issued.7 9
Three days after the passage of the Stadium Act, several parties
opposed to the stadium's construction made an attempt to file a petition for referendum with Washington's Secretary of State, Ralph
Munro."° A petition for referendum would have referred the issue of
whether the Stadium Act should be upheld back to the people of King
County for a general popular vote. Judging from the pre-Stadium Act
referendum where the public rejected King County's tax plan to
finance the construction of the stadium, it is quite possible that the
Act would have been similarly struck down.81 Instead, Ralph Munro
declined to accept the petition, on the basis that the Stadium Act's
emergency clause exempted it from the referendum process.8 2 Three
days later, CLEAN v. State was filed, the first of three lawsuits against
the construction of the stadium. 3
The plaintiffs in CLEAN v. State asserted that the Stadium Act
78. Stadium Act § 201(4)(b). At the time of publication, the Mariners have paid their
required $45 million, but the team faces an estimated $100 million in cost overruns for which it is
likely also responsible as part of its lease agreement with King County. The Mariners have
demanded that King County pay an additional $60 million of these cost overruns. King County
has thus far refused and has rejected mediation over the issue. See Michele Matassa Flores, Are
Mariners Guessing High on Tax Dollars?,SEATTLE TIMES, June 27, 1999 at Al.
79. Stadium Act § 201(4)(c) at 5.
80. See CLEAN, 130 Wash. 2d 782, 791, 928 P.2d 1054, 1058 (1997). Article II, section
l(b) of Washington's constitution provides: "The second power [in addition to the legislative
powers reserved] by the people is the referendum, [which] may be ordered on any act, bill, law,
or any part thereof passed by the legislature, except such laws as may be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety..."; WA. CONST. art. II, § l(b). Referenda are begun by gathering signatures which are then presented to the Secretary of State. The
Secretary then endorses the referendum and the issue is put on the next ballot for public vote.
The referendum process plays an important role in checking the power of the legislature and
reinforcing grass roots political movements. For example, referenda have been held on issues of
acquiring public property, appointing game commissioners, rezoning property, ratifying federal
prohibition, issuing bonds to alleviate statewide poverty, and increasing fuel taxes. See State ex
rel. Humiston v. Meyers, 61 Wash. 2d 772, 777, 380 P.2d 735, 738 (1963). However, under the
provisions of article II, section 1 of Washington's constitution, the people's right to referendum
is exempted by laws passed by the legislature for the immediate preservation of the public peace,
health or safety, or for support of the state government and its existing institutions. WA.
CONST., art. II, § 1(b) (emphasis added).
81. See supra note 5.
82. 130 Wash. 2d at 791, 928 P.2d at 1058.
83. 130 Wash. 2d at 791, 928 P.2d at 1058-59. See also Citizens for More Important
Things v. King County, 131 Wash. 2d 411, 932 P.2d 135 (1997), King County v. Taxpayers of
King County, 133 Wash. 2d 584, 949 P.2d 1260 (1997).
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violated the Washington Constitution, article VIII, sections 5 and 7,
article II, sections 1 and 28, and article VII, section 184 The plaintiffs
first argued that under article VIII's provisions King County's issuance of bonds, as well as the tax imposed by the public facilities district, were violations of the prohibitions against the public8 5lending of
credit to a private corporation such as the Seattle Mariners.
Additionally, the plaintiffs argued that financing the stadium
construction through the imposition of a tax was not a public purpose
under the provisions of article VII, section 1 and was unconstitutional.8 6 A concurrent argument under article II, section 28 was also
made. The plaintiffs claimed that the Stadium Act was therefore special legislation under which no tax could be levied.87 Finally, the
plaintiffs argued that their right to referendum under article II section
1 was violated because the construction of the stadium was not an
emergency.88

1.

The Majority View: Legislative Deference
and Constitutional Erosion

All of the plaintiffs' claims were rejected by the Washington
Supreme Court. First addressing the plaintiffs' article VII, section 1
claim that the stadium did not constitute a public purpose, the majority found that "the construction of a major league baseball stadium in
King County confers a benefit of reasonably general character to a significant part of King County.... "89 Moreover, the majority found
that the benefit the Seattle Mariners may enjoy as the principle tenant
of the publicly held building was incidental to the broader public purpose the stadium provided.9"
The court then turned to the plaintiffs' claims under article VIII,
sections 5 and 7. In its rejection of these claims, the majority utilized
the two-prong consideration test set forth in Taxpayers.91 Finding that
the construction of a baseball stadium did not serve a fundamental
84. Article I, section 1 provides that "[tihe legislature is prohibited from enacting any private or special laws ... (5) [flor assessment or collection of taxes, or ... (6) [flor granting corporate powers or privileges. WA CONST., art. VII, § 1. Article VII section 1 provides that "the
power of taxation shall never be suspended.. . or contracted away." WA CONST., art. VII, § 1.
85. See CLEAN, 130 Wash. 2d at 791-92, 928 P.2d at 1058-59.
86. See id. at 792, 928 P.2d at 1059.
87. See 130 Wash. 2d at 801, 928 P.2d at 1063.
88. Id. at 803, 928 P.2d at 1065.
89. Id. at 796, 928 P.2d at 1060.
90. Id. at 796, 928 P.2d at 1061. See also United States v. Town of North Bonneville, 94
Wash. 2d 827, 834, 621 P.2d 127, 130 (1980) (holding that the fact that private ends are
incidentally advanced is immaterial to determining whether legislation serves a public purpose).
91. See also Adams v. University of Washington, 106 Wash. 2d 312, 327, 722 P.2d 74, 82
(1986).
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governmental purpose, the court analyzed whether there was any
donative intent, on the part of the state or King County in financing
the construction and operation of the stadium. 92 The court found no
donative intent and stated that sufficient consideration existed through
the Seattle Mariners' payment of rent for using the stadium.93 The
court justified its position by rationalizing that the district would
wholly own the stadium upon its completion. 94 Nonetheless, the
majority acknowledged article VIII, sections 5 and 7 when it suggested
that article ViII's constraints could be implicated if the Mariners were
to enter an agreement with the district to pay only nominal rent.9"
The court had greater difficulty in determining whether the
plaintiffs were correct in their assertion that their constitutionally
protected rights to referendum under article II, section 1 were violated
by the Stadium Act's proclamation of emergency.9 6 The plaintiffs
claimed that their right to referendum should be reinstated because
the construction and ultimate operation of a new baseball stadium for
the Seattle Mariners was not an emergency. 97 While the court rightfully conceded that the emergent nature of constructing a new baseball
stadium was questionable, the court again granted deference to the
Washington Legislature's declaration of an emergency."
The court justified this deference by stating:
We are satisfied that the Legislature acted to maintain major
league baseball in this state in the face of a clear and present
danger that.., the Seattle Mariners, would depart.., if prompt
action was not taken to assure that a new publicly owned stadium would be developed in King County. The specter of this
loss was a circumstance that the Legislature reasonably could
believe would result in a loss of jobs, tax revenue, [and] recreational opportunities, while at the same time diminishing the
quality of life for a substantial number of the state's citizens. 9
92. CLEAN v. State, 130 Wash. 2d 782, 798-99, 928 P.2d 1054, 1062 (1997).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 801, 928 P.2d at 1063.
95. Id. at 800, 928 P.2d at 1062.
96. Stadium Act, 1995-1996 Wash. Laws, 3rd. Spec. Sess., ch. 1, § 310 at 13.
97. 130 Wash. 2d at 787, 928 P.2d at 1056.
98. The court stated that it would have to agree with CLEAN that "the prospect of losing a
major league baseball franchise cannot be said to be an emergency of apocalyptic dimensions,"
yet the legislature
was faced with a real emergency in the sense that the public purpose they sought to
achieve would be unattainable if the Mariners franchise was sold to investors from
another area before the legislature could assure the owners of that franchise that a new
baseball stadium would be developed in King County.
130 Wash. 2d at 809, 928 P.2d at 1067.
99. Id. at 808-09, 928 P.2d at 1067. See also 130 Wash. 2d at 813-19, 928 P.2d at 1070-72
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The court's justification of Safeco Field's construction as a clear
and present danger which would diminish the quality of life of a large
number of state citizens is unwarranted. While the loss of the Mariners would potentially leave many baseball fans disappointed, disappointment alone should not qualify as an "emergency" preempting the
majority of citizens from exercising their right to vote in a referendum.
The detrimental economic effect of the loss of the Mariners on
local area vendors and restaurateurs is similarly unavailing as an argument justifying an emergency. The baseball season only lasts six
months of the year, leaving vendors and restaurateurs an extra six
months in which they must obtain income from other sources. Given
the location of the Kingdome in a popular tourist area and the existence of several other professional sports teams in the Seattle and King
County areas, there are sufficient alternative economic opportunities
to recoup any loss that might occur if the Mariners were to leave.
Moreover, denying a majority of citizens their constitutional
right to a referendum due to the special economic concerns of a minority legislative interest group does a disservice to the role of the court as
a guardian of democratic process. 1°° While baseball is fun and pleases
a broad constituency, people nonetheless should have a right to decide
whether they want their tax dollars spent on it.
2.

The Dissent: Small but Vocal

In recognizing the fallacy in the majority's justification of an
emergency, Justices Guy and Sanders attacked the majority's position
on the referendum issue in a strongly worded dissent. As Justice Guy
wrote, "We have a duty to test the emergency clause against the backdrop of the constitutional right of referendum. We are not free to
rubber-stamp an emergency clause when there are no facts recited in
the legislation ... which would support the existence of an emer' 1°
gency.
Justice Sanders followed suit by quoting Justice Marshall in
McCulloch v. Maryland:°2 "We must never forget that it is a Constitution we are expounding,"' 3 reemphasizing the need to interpret
(Talmadge, J., concurring). Justice Talmadge made much of judicial deference to the legislature's right to enact legislation as it sees fit. Focusing on the separation of powers between the
judiciary and the legislature, Talmadge asserts that the court "must be cognizant of the separation of powers and the appropriate role of each branch of... government." 130 Wash. 2d at
817, 928 P.2d at 1071 (citing Hamilton v. Martin, 173 Wash. 249, 23 P.2d 1 (1933)).
100. For a good discussion of the judiciary's role as a guardian of democratic process see
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).

101.
102.
103.

CLEAN, 130 Wash. 2d 782,821, 928 P.2d 1054, 1073 (1997).
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
130 Wash. 2d at 821, 928 P.2d at 1073 (citing McCullough, 17 U.S. at 407).
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Washington's constitutional provisions as they appear in the text.
Justice Sanders attacked the emergency clause mainly because the
taxes imposed under the Stadium Act were not to be imposed until
January 1, while under regular, nonemergent legislation, the taxes
would have been imposed on January 15 anyway, thus rebutting the
need for any emergent immediacy.1"4
As the sole defender of the constitutional prohibitions on the
lending of public funds, Justice Sanders would prove to be a voice of
dissent in two additional cases brought against the Stadium Act following CLEAN, Citizens for More Important Things v. King County,"°5
and King County v. Taxpayers of King County."°6 In these cases, the
court upheld aspects of the Act's funding provisions as constitutional.
In Citizens, a public interest group challenged the Act's authorization of the taxes funding the stadium construction as void for want
of a lawful purpose." 7 The challengers viewed the tax as unlawful
because it was used to finance the preconstruction costs of building the
stadium when it was not certain whether the Mariners would commit
to the provisions of the
Stadium Act, which would authorize the sta08
dium's construction.1
The Citizens' majority reiterated its previous position in
CLEAN, and rejected the challengers on the basis that they had no
legal authority to support their contention that the preconstruction
costs could not be financed through the Stadium Act's authorized
tax.0 9 Justice Sanders' dissent in Citizens focused on the fact that the
taxes authorized by the Act and implemented through a King County
ordinance were authorized for the actual construction of the stadium
but not for preconstruction costs." 0 Thus, the majority was supporting the Act by inferring nonexistent legislative authority to allow for
payment of preconstruction costs where the Act dictated payment only
for actual costs.
In Taxpayers, King County sought to fend off additional legal
challenges by bringing an action for declaratory relief to prove that the
104. Id. at 823, 928 P.2d at 1074.
105. 131 Wash. 2d411, 932 P.2d 135 (1997).
106. 133 Wash. 2d 584, 949 P.2d 1260 (1997). In addition to these cases, Justice Sanders

has proved to be the Washington Supreme Court's sole voice of reason in post-CLEAN v. State
challenges to public-private partnerships. See, e.g., Brower, 137 Wash. 2d 44, 80, 969 P.2d 42,
62 (1998) (again critiquing the majority's deference to legislative declarations of emergency in a
challenge to the construction of a new football stadium for the Seattle Seahawks).
107. See 131 Wash. 2d at 417, 932 P.2d at 138.
108. Id. At the time of writing, the Mariners are in a dispute with King County over the
"actual costs" of the stadium. See supra note 78.
109. Id. at 417-18, 932 P.2d at 138.
110. Id.
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bonds issued through the district pursuant to the Stadium Act were
valid. " ' Justice Talmadge, writing for the majority, found the bonds
valid and reiterated the court's holding in CLEAN. He rejected a
further claim under article VIII, sections 5 and 7 which sought to
overturn the Stadium Act as unconstitutional. 1 12 The court again
focused on the incidental benefit analysis, claiming that any benefit to
the Seattle Mariners as a private organization was merely incidental to
broader public purposes.' 3
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Sanders challenged the majority's findings, stating that the action brought by King County was in
clear violation of article VIII, sections 5 and 7.114 Justice Sanders characterized King County's action as one which would "finally, permanently, and absolutely deny each of the million plus county taxpayers
any lawful defense or democratic remedy against imposition of $336
[million] in additional public debt.""' Justice Sanders also analyzed
the consideration test set forth first in Taxpayers," 6 finding that the
sufficiency of consideration test set forth by the majority did not preclude the possibility that a gift might have occurred." 7 Because the
consideration was not examined for the actual amount exchanged,
Justice Sanders found strong inferences of donative intent on the part
of the State which would otherwise violate sections 5 and 7.118
Justice Sanders' dissents in the three cases illustrate the complete
erosion of the constitutional prohibition against the public gifting of
funds if the court continues down its current path. While Justice
Sanders' dissenting voice in the three legal challenges to the Stadium
Act highlighted both possible flaws in the majority's analysis as well
as his own disapproval of the majority opinion, ultimately the Stadium
Act survived its challenges. However, the challenges brought against
the Act, including Justice Sanders' dissents, illustrate at least three
legal mechanisms used by both the legislature and the court to benefit
public-private partnership arrangements while at the same time circumventing Washington's constitutional ban on the gifting of public
funds to private organizations.
The first mechanism illustrated is the creation of a municipal
corporation, or "public facilities district" as it is termed under the Sta111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

133 Wash. 2d at 592, 949 P.2d at 1264.
Id. at 589, 949 P.2d at 1263.
Id. at 596, 949 P.2d at 1267.
Id. at 614, 949 P.2d at 1275.
Id.
See also Adams, 106 Wash. 2d 312, 327, 722 P.2d 74, 82 (1986).
See 133 Wash. 2d at 625, 949 P.2d at 1280.
Id.
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dium Act.' 19 As seen in Anderson v. O'Brien,2 ° by creating a public
entity, such as the public facilities district, to control the financing
aspects of the stadium's construction, the State is able to confer a
benefit to a private organization without running into a wall of constitutional proscription.'
At the same time, by channeling money
into a public entity such as a municipal corporation or public facilities
district, the government is able to avoid obvious public purpose violations. The municipal corporation is a public entity, and the channeling of funds through a public entity yields a strong inference of public
purpose which successfully avoids constitutional scrutiny by the
court. 2 2 Thus, when used as a legislative device, the public corporation appears to exist for a public purpose. The end result is an effective device used to implement public-private financial initiatives that
appear to benefit only the public.
The problem with creating a public entity to legitimize the public purpose of a governmental expenditure is that it completely obfuscates the potential for private benefit prohibited by sections 5 and 7.
It is as if the government can simply apply a label and legitimize what
would otherwise be proscribed by constitutional prohibition. The end
result, however, is a unique tool that will only create broader publicprivate arrangements and further distance the public from effective
control over how its tax dollars are spent.
The second mechanism illustrated by CLEAN is the court's consistent invocation of a public purpose analysis to determine whether
gifting or lending of public funds has taken place. This mechanism is
also frequently used by public-private partnerships in assorted development projects. The effect of the court's and legislature's public
purpose analysis is that any benefit received by private entities, such
as the Seattle Mariners, is merely incidental to the broader public
benefit received by the public through governmental financial aid.
The creation of a new baseball stadium does serve a very beneficial public purpose. It is difficult to reject new opportunities for job
creation or increased economic benefit to a growing region. Yet, the
new Seattle Mariners stadium will only benefit that sector of the econ119. For a good discussion of business improvement districts/municipal corporations, see
David J. Kennedy, Note, Restraining the Power of Business Improvement Districts: The Case of the
Grand CentralPartnership, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 283 (1996).
120. 84 Wash. 2d 64, 524 P.2d 390 (1974).
121. See 84 Wash. 2d at 68, 524 P.2d at 392. See also WASH. REV. CODE § 35.21.730
(1998) (authorizing the creation of public corporations, commissions, and authorities to administer any lawful public purpose or function).
122. This still does not mean that governments or municipal corporations can act as fmancing conduits to private entities. See Lassila v. City of Wenatchee, 89 Wash. 2d 804, 811-12, 576
P.2d 54, 58 (1978).
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omy that sufficiently supports or otherwise relies upon major league
baseball as a major income source. There are certainly many residents
of King County like Roberto Alvarez who are not served by the new
stadium, because they are either uninterested in baseball, or lack the
means to attend baseball games.
Finally, whether baseball or other sports stadiums serve a public
purpose as good investments is also open to wide debate. 123 The
Mariners are overbudget on their part of the construction arrangement, which could translate into higher ticket prices, and preclude
even more people from attending games. 24 The citizens certainly are
not receiving the benefit of their bargain as a function of a public purpose if they cannot afford to attend a baseball game, even if they had
been allowed to vote on the matter.
While not used to directly circumvent the constitutional ban on
governmental gifting of public funds, the third and most potentially
powerful mechanism illustrated by CLEAN to benefit public-private
partnerships is the legislature's use of emergency clauses. Emergency
clauses benefit public-private arrangements by severely limiting the
opportunity of citizens opposed to certain legislation to challenge it
through a constitutionally protected referendum process. Because the
citizens' right to referendum is precluded by declarations of emer2
1
gency, the only avenue of redress available to citizens is the courts.
Yet, as CLEAN showed, the court grants strong deference to
legislative declarations of emergency. 126 Thus, due to the judiciary's
desire to abstain from activism, it is unlikely that citizens can successfully bring an adequate claim against undesirable or questionable
legislation. In essence, the people's voice in affairs of their own government is cut off from the possibility of debate. Given that the voters
123. See Pamela Edwards, Note, How Much Does That $8.00 Yankee Ticket Really Cost?
An Analysis of Local Governments' Expenditure of Public Funds to Maintain, Improve or Acquire an
Athletic Stadium for the Use of Professional Sports Teams, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 695, 698-99
(1991) (stating that at least one economist had found no correlation between sports stadiums and
local long term economic growth); Kenneth L. Shropshire, Putting the Pursuit into Perspective:
The Value of Sports, A.L.I., SC47-ALI-ABA 525 (1998) (stating that sports, albeit an important
aspect of a city, are not a financial savior for troubled cities); Hal Lancaster, Stadium Projects Are
ProliferatingAmid Debate Over Benefit to Cities, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Friday, March
20, 1987, § 3 at 37.
124. Interview with Tom Fuller, SEATTLE TIMES sportswriter (January 5, 1999). See also
Flores, supra note 78. The latest estimated cost of the stadium is $518 million. King Five News
report (KING-TV television broadcast, April 6, 1999). The Stadium Act provides for $336 million of this cost.
125. See supra note 80.
126. Justice Sanders takes great issue with this in his dissent, finding that whether an emergency exists is a judicial question. See CLEAN, 130 Wash. 2d 782, 830, 928 P.2d 1054, 1077
(1999) (citing State ex rel. McLeod v. Reeves, 22 Wash. 2d 672, 674, 157 P.2d 718, 720 (1945)
(holding that whether an emergency exists is ultimately a judicial question)).
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of King County rejected the imposition of a tax to construct a new
baseball stadium once, who is to say they would not do the same again
if they had a chance?
Assuming, as does the majority in CLEAN v. State, that the stadium's construction was not violative of sections 5 and 7, it is clear
that the majority's support of the Stadium Act's emergency clause
violated the people's right to govern themselves, thus highlighting a
current area of government process that definitely needs reform.'27
Without such reform, citizens will continue to be forced into needless
litigation to enforce their public choices. This is unacceptable given
Washington's existing referendum clause, which already functions as
a voice of the people. Unfortunately, as the next two case studies
illustrate, the use of emergency clauses to exempt referendums is a
growing and widespread trend.
B. A New Parking Garagefor Nordstrom with Spokane's Tax Dollars
The use of legislative emergency clauses to facilitate the development of public-private partnerships can also occur on a local level.
In early 1995, a group of private developers entered into discussions
with the City of Spokane regarding the renovation and expansion of a
mall parking garage."' The renovation and redevelopment of the
mall, called River Park Square, was to include a new Nordstrom store
to replace the existing one, and was designed to "improve cultural and
recreational opportunities in downtown Spokane." 129
The City of Spokane agreed to the developers' plan, and it was
agreed that upon completion of the development, the developers
would sell the mall parking garage to the Spokane Downtown Foundation (Foundation), a nonprofit municipal corporation similar to the
public facilities district in CLEAN v. State.3 ° To generate revenue for
the development, the plan called for the Foundation to issue taxexempt bonds on behalf of the city. These bonds would be repaid
through parking garage revenues.' 3' In turn, the Foundation would
lease its interest in the garage to the Spokane Public Development
Authority.'3 2
To obtain additional financing for the project, the City of Spo127. See infra Section III.
128. See CLEAN v. City of Spokane, 133 Wash. 2d 455, 460, 947 P.2d 1169, 1171 (1997).
129. Id. at 460, 947 P.2d at 1172. Nordstrom is a national retail chain based in Seattle,
Washington.
130. Id. See also 130 Wash. 2d at 790, 928 P.2d at 1058.
131. 133 Wash. 2d at 460-61, 947 P.2d at 1172.
132. Id. The Spokane Public Development Authority is another municipal corporation
authorized under WASH. REV. CODE § 53.21.730 (1998).

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 23:17S

kane applied for an Economic Development Grant (EDI) and a Section 108 guaranteed development loan issued by the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). 3 HUD
then awarded the city a one million dollar EDI grant.'34 Following the
Spokane City Council's approval of an emergency ordinance authorizing support for the garage on January 27, 1997, the development was
underway.'35
Three days after the City Council's endorsement of the River
Park Square project, a group called "Priorities First" presented the
Spokane City Clerk with a referendum petition to overturn the ordinance.136 Priorities First had collected over 8000 signatures for its
petition. 3 7 Despite the widespread support for overturning the ordinance, the City of Spokane declined to honor the petition because of
the emergent nature of the ordinance. 3 ' Soon thereafter, Citizens for
Leaders with Accountability and Ethics Now, the same group who
had first filed suit against the Stadium Act, filed suit against the City
of Spokane.'3 9
CLEAN claimed, among other things, that the ordinance passed
by the Spokane City Council violated: (1) Washington Constitution
article VII, section l's public purpose doctrine; 4 ' (2) article VIII, sections 5 and 7's ban on public gifting or lending of credit to private
entities;14 ' (3) section 83 of the Spokane City Charter, which provides
for referendum except in cases of emergency; 142 and (4) Section
which allows Wash35.21.730 of the Revised Code of Washington,
143
ington cities to create public corporations.
The Washington Supreme Court rejected all of CLEAN's claims
as invalid. Largely relying upon its previous opinion in CLEAN v.
State, the court found that the River Park Square development would
133. 133 Wash. 2d at 461, 947 P.2d at 1172. EDI grants are authorized by HUD under 24
C.F.R. §570.204, and provide for economic development grants for neighborhood revitalization
and community economic development projects which increase economic opportunity. 24
C.F.R. §570.204 (a)(1) and (a)(2) (1999). Section 108 HUD loans are normally granted for purposes of economic redevelopment in areas of "spot blight," or economically marginalized communities.
134. 133 Wash. 2d at 461, 947 P.2d at 1172.
135. Id.
136. CLEAN v. City of Spokane, 133 Wash. 2d at 461, 947 P.2d at 1172.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. WA. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
141. WA. CONST. art. VII, §§5 and 7.
142. Spokane City Charter section 83 allows for referendum when the requisite number of
signatures are obtained prior to the date when any ordinance shall take effect.
143. WASH. REV. CODE §35.21.730 (1998).
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serve an adequate public purpose by "thwarting the economic decline"
of downtown Spokane.'
Writing for the majority, Justice Dolliver
reiterated the court's position first set forth in O'Brien that, "Where it
is debatable as to whether or not an expenditure is for a public purpose, we will defer to the judgment of the legislature."' 4 5 In deferring
to the judgment of the Spokane City Council, the court rejected
CLEAN's article VII, section 1 claims.
Second, the court rejected CLEAN's challenge to the River Park
Square under article VIII, sections 5 and 7, relying on CLEAN v.
State. The court found that because the parking facility would ultimately belong to the city, there was no unconstitutional lending of
credit.'46 Furthermore, the court found that the consideration received
for the city's participation in the project was legally sufficient to meet
the test set forth in Taxpayers.'4 7 Thus, there was no unconstitutional
gift of public funds.148
Similarly, analyzing CLEAN's claims against the Spokane City
Council's proclamation of an emergency, the court found that Spokane's referendum provisions were nearly identical to those examined
in CLEAN v. State, and thus rejected CLEAN's referendum challenge.149 The court conceded that there was a lack of proof that Nordstrom would leave Spokane if a new mall were not built, but stated
that under CLEAN v. State it was required to defer to the judgment of
the Spokane City Council in its declaration of an emergency.is °
Finally, the court did not accept CLEAN's claims that the City
of Spokane had exceeded its authority under section 35.21.730 of the
RCW by allowing the Public Development Authority to operate the
parking garage. The court found that the Public Development
Authority was consistent with section 35.21.730 of the RCW because
it (1) facilitated the "administration of authorized federal grants," (2)
improved "governmental efficiency and services," and (3) improved
the general living conditions in the Spokane area."' The court sum144. 133 Wash. 2d at 468, 947 P.2d at 1175.
145. Id. (citing Anderson v. O'Brien, 84 Wash. 2d 64, 524 P.2d 390 (1974)).
146. Id. at 469, 947 P.2d at 1176.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 470, 947 P.2dat 1176.
149. Id. at 471, 947 P.2dat 1177.
150. 133 Wash. 2d at 472, 477, 947 P.2d at 1177, 1179. Justice Madsen concurred in the
opinion, but found that the new method of reading the Washington Constitution following
CLEAN v. State is unfortunate: "After CLEAN, this Court no longer conducts an independent
analysis of whether a law is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health,
or safety within the meaning of Const. art. XI, sec. 1(b). The emergency exception is now coextensive with the police powers." Id.
151. Id. at 473, 947 P.2d at 1178; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 35.21.730 (1998).
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1 52
marily dismissed the claims as "meritless.'
In an eloquent dissent, Chief Justice Durham strongly disagreed
with the majority's opinion concerning the validity of the Spokane
City Council's declaration of emergency. Analyzing the history of
emergency clauses in Washington, Justice Durham found that the
court defers to legislative declarations of emergency only when the
legislature declares facts that constitute an emergency in an ordinance."l 3 This contrasts starkly with the majority's interpretation
under CLEAN v. State, which found it necessary to defer to the
legislature based on a legislative declaration of emergency despite the
nonexistence of facts in the ordinance which constitute an emergency.' 54 Finding that the court has never given effect to an assertion of
emergency on its face, Justice Durham stated that because the Spokane
City Council's declaration of emergency was not based 1in55 fact,
deference to the council as a legislative body was inappropriate.
Like the construction of a baseball stadium in Seattle, the redevelopment of River Park Square illustrates how a local government can
use mechanisms such as court complicity, public corporations, and
legislative emergency clauses to finance public development. These
mechanisms benefit private concerns and create a constructive publicprivate partnership arrangement. Although the Spokane City Council
did not directly lend or gift any public money to a private corporation,
a parking garage that is to be constructed right next to a major retail
establishment will benefit that retail establishment, even if only incidentally. While this in itself may not qualify as a constitutional violation, it raises questions of accountability and gives rise to an inference
of a public-private partnership even if one does not formally exist.
The larger problem with the Spokane City Council's expenditures is that the people are again denied a right to control or otherwise
have a voice in the affairs of developments which affect them. Even if
none of the public funds expended benefited Nordstrom in the River
Park Square project, eight thousand of Spokane's residents were nevertheless denied their constitutionally prescribed right to control how
their city was developed. Thus, the concept of public benefit advocated by the city contrasts with the concept of electoral democracy that
the Spokane City Council is designed to represent. The end result is
that Spokane's citizens must go to court to enforce what should be a

152. 133 Wash. 2d at 473, 947 P.2d at 1178.
153. Id. at 478, 947 P.2d at 1180.
154. See id. at 472, 947 P.2d at 1177. The court stated, "CLEAN v. State requires this
court to defer to the City Council's emergency declaration unless it is 'obviously false and a palpable attempt at dissimulation."' Id.
155. Id. at 489, 947 P.2d at 1185.
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democratic choice and are rejected by a court unwilling to enforce the
democratic process.
By endorsing the Spokane City Council's declaration of emergency, the Washington Supreme Court furthered the development of
public-private arrangements. As a result, citizens are denied their
right to participate in development through the referendum process,
and the gap between the citizens of Spokane and their politically
accountable representatives is increased. Economic development is a
good thing, but why have a system of participatory democracy when
one cannot use it? The next case study takes a closer look at this
question, where the public did not even know about a development
project until it was under construction.
C. Another Parking Garagefor the Retailers at the Public'sExpense
As evidenced in CLEAN v. Spokane, as cities grow, the need for
parking garages often increases. To meet this need, municipalities will
go to great lengths to create new development to serve their economic
visions for the city. In 1992, Frederick and Nelson, a long-time
retailer in the city of Seattle, went out of business, leaving an empty
15 6
building which took up a city block on the corner of 5th and Pine.
As the building lay vacant, the crime rate around the building
increased, parking rates increased, and panhandlers proliferated, turning the area into a depressed slum." 7
At least, that is how the City of Seattle portrayed the area surrounding the old Frederick and Nelson building when the City was
approached by a private developer called Pine Street Development in
late 1993.158 Jeff Rhodes, the founder of Pine Street Development,
presented a plan where Nordstrom, a major retailer with a store across
the street from the old Frederick and Nelson building, would move
into the empty Frederick and Nelson building and convert its current
site into additional retail and office space. 159 This store swap was part
of a broader retail development which included the construction of a
6
high-rise retail mall and an adjacent underground parking garage.1 1
The idea behind the redevelopment was to revitalize Seattle's
156. Peter Lewis, Probe Stalls Rice's Possible HUD Nomination, SEATTLE TIMES, December 13, 1996, at Al.
157. Barbara A. Serrano and Deborah Nelson, City Overpaid Pine Street Developer-Mayor
Says Hefty Pricefor Parking Garage Was Justified Because It Sealed Dealfor Frederick and Nelson
Building, SEATTLE TIMES, December 21, 1997, at Al.
158. Id.
159. Nordstrom's original store was situated diagonally across an intersection from the
larger Frederick and Nelson building. Nordstrom reopened its flagship store in the fall of 1998.
160. Serrano and Nelson, supra note 157.

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 23:175

downtown retail core and provide increased economic stimulus
through retail spending and job creation. As a key player in Seattle's
downtown retail economy, Nordstrom played an integral role in the
redevelopment design envisioned by both Pine Street Development
and the City of Seattle. 6' The central problem was that the 700,000
square foot Frederick and Nelson building was in need of extensive
renovation before any redevelopment could occur and Nordstrom

could move in.162

The redevelopment plan called for Pine Street Development to
outlay approximately $400 million to buy the abandoned Frederick
and Nelson building, renovate it, and swap it with Nordstrom's
smaller store across the street. 163 Nordstrom would assist with reno-

vation

costs. 1

64

Although the City of Seattle supported the project,

Pine Street Development insisted on the construction of a new parking
garage to service the downtown retail core.'65 Facing a huge financial
obstacle to the redevelopment without the parking garage, the City of
Seattle began a series of complicated financial maneuvers to secure
capital to meet Pine Street Development's vision.166
First, like the City of Spokane and the River Park Square development, in 1994, the City of Seattle applied for a $24.2 million subsidized Section 108 loan from HUD. 167 Declaring the Frederick and
Nelson building to be "spot blight," HUD granted the city its loan.
Pine Street Development,
The City then disbursed the funds through
16
beginning the redevelopment process.
However, the HUD loan to the City proved insufficient to meet
the financial needs of the redevelopment and the construction of a new
parking garage. 169 Pine Street Development recruited a nonprofit firm
called Community Development Properties to obtain more financing. 7 ° Community Development Properties would own the parking
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. The parking garage was crucial to the design of the development plan. Under the
plan, Seattle was to fund the costs of the parking garage. If no parking garage were built, Pine
Street Development would pull out. Id.
166. Serrano and Nelson, supra note 157.
167. Id. See also supra note 133.
168. Lewis, supra note 156, at Al. There is speculation that the mischaracterization of the
Frederick's building as "spot blight" may have ultimately led the denial of Seattle Mayor Norm
Rice's consideration for nomination to the position of HUD Secretary. The White House had
planned a possible nomination of Mr. Rice to the position upon the resignation of Secretary
Henry Cisneros in 1994. Id.
169. Serrano and Nelson, supra note 156.
170. Id.
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garage land during construction, which, when combined with its nonprofit status, allowed it to receive a tax-exempt loan from the Washington State Housing Finance Commission (HFC).' 7' HFC disbursed
such loans to charities to benefit low income or economically
depressed housing markets.'72 While HFC does not lend the money
itself, it arranges for such loans through institutional lenders.'73
The final plan called for Pine Street Development to construct
the new parking garage using funds granted it by the City of Seattle
and HFC. Upon completion of the garage, it would be sold back to
174
the City by Community Development Properties for $73 million.
In 1995, the Seattle City Council approved the $73 million sales price
for the garage without holding public hearings.171
While some Seattle City Council members expressed initial disapproval over the price, public disapproval was realized when it was
discovered that the actual price tag of the parking garage was only $50
million. 176 After an investigation by the State Attorney General and
the State Auditor, it was determined that the City did nothing wrong
in paying an extra $23 million for what would become a public parking garage.'
There has been no explanation to date regarding the
excess payment of the $23 million.
While downtown Seattle stands to receive much economic benefit from the redevelopment of the Frederick and Nelson building and
the addition of the adjacent new Pacific Place Mall's parking garage,
the public was largely uninformed about the process involved in using
public money to construct a parking garage that serves private interests. 7 Most of the public did not learn about the deal until a December 21, 1996 Seattle Times article. 9 Thus, like the Seattle Mariners
stadium construction and the redevelopment of Spokane's River Park
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. HFC is prohibited from making loans under article VII, sections 5 and 7 of the
Washington Constitution.
174. Serrano and Nelson, supra note 157.
175. Susan Byrnes, City Ethics Panel Rejects Appeal on Garage Deal, SEATTLE TIMES,
March 5, 1998, at Al (detailing the Seattle Ethics and Elections Commission's investigation,
which found that the city did not hold a public hearing before voting in 1995 to pay $73 million
for the parking garage).
176. Serrano and Nelson, supra note 157.
177. Barbara A. Serrano, Seattle Absolved in Parking Garage Deal-No Wrongdoing State
Auditor Says Today, SEATTLE TIMES, June 17, 1998, at Al.
178. While the City stands to gain from increased property taxes, business license fees, and
parking revenues, private interests such as Nordstrom, Pine Street Development, and the other
retailers of the Pacific Place Mall are the primary beneficiaries of the parking garage's construction.
179. See Serrano and Nelson supra note 157.
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Square, the public was effectively denied a voice regarding development by the Seattle City Council and Pine Street Development.
On April 16, 1998, CLEAN filed a suit in King County Superior
Court against the City of Seattle, alleging that the City violated state
law by failing to hold required hearings before agreeing to pay $73
million for a parking garage."' Even though this is still a pending case
that has not created precedent, the case highlights citizens' concerns
over the development of public-private partnerships and the lack of
public participation in that process of development. If CLEAN v.
State and CLEAN v. City of Spokane are any example, the Washington Supreme Court in the foreseeable CLEAN v. City of Seattle will
quite likely again find an adequate governmental purpose, and sufficient consideration in the form of a public benefit, to exempt Seattle
from any constitutional violations.
The denial of citizen input into affairs that directly affect them
raises the question of how much we as a society want our elected leaders freely spending our tax dollars. More importantly, preventing citizens from taking action, either through the legislature or the judiciary,
impinges on the democratic process while substituting private (and
often corporate) concerns for those of the citizenry. While corporate
lobbying is nothing new, citizens should have the opportunity to contest a corporate development they do not support when that development involves the use of public money and affects citizens' lives.
Clearly, reform in the area of public-private arrangements is needed.
Options for this reform are examined in the following section.
IV. ANALYSIS: THE PROPER ROLE OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE
PARTNERSHIPS AND OPTIONS FOR REFORM

Economic development is often advanced as a reason for creating
Economic development is arguably
public-private partnerships.
beneficial to society. Indeed, if one looks at how downtown Seattle has
changed over the past ten years, it appears that the economy is booming.181 One can even now park at night in the new Pacific Place garage
for $2.00 and shop at Nordstrom's flagship store.
Yet, despite the boons that public-private partnerships provide,
as long as citizens' input is consistently shut out of economic devel180. CLEAN. v. City of Seattle, No. 98-2-09656-OSEA, trial pending Nov. 15, 1999 (King
County Sup. Ct. 1998); see also Steven Goldsmith, Citizens Group Sues Over Pine Street Garage
Funding, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, January 17, 1998, at B2.
181. The Pacific Place Mall development has led to the introduction of many influential

out-of-state retailers, created a boon for the local downtown restaurant industry, and spurred
retail and service oriented job creation. See Norm Rice and Jan Drago, Public Fundingfor Garage
Is a Wise City Investment, SEATTLE TIMES, December 25, 1997, at B5.
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opment projects, questions will remain as to what the proper role of
public-private partnerships should be. Critics of public-private partnerships are quick to point out that partnerships breed marginalization, raise antitrust issues, and cause massive information costs to the
public. 182 Yet, because of their success across the nation in recent
years, public-private partnerships are likely to proliferate in the future.
A balance needs to be struck defining a better role for public-private
partnerships. This balance should allow the public greater participation concerning how public money is spent, and promote the economic
development that private industry can provide with public assistance.
This Comment examines at least five possible options to redefine that
role.
A. Eliminate the ConstitutionalProscriptionson
Public Funding of PrivateEntities
The first option would be to completely legitimize public-private
partnerships by amending the Washington Constitution to eliminate
article VIII, sections 5 and 7. While this sounds extreme, and raises
many of the concerns voiced in the creation of article VIII, it is not so
difficult to imagine. Currently, governments use the mechanisms
described in this article to achieve the same ends as if the constitutional proscription were nonexistent. Eliminating the constitutional
prohibitions would eliminate the need for substantive legal mechanisms, such as emergency clauses, to sidestep those prohibitions.
Furthermore, eliminating the constitutional proscriptions on
governmental gifting of funds would eliminate much of the ineffective
litigation surrounding these issues. Litigation focuses on the end
result of public-private arrangements, not the means by which they
are developed. By eliminating the proscriptions on both the ends and
the means of public-private partnerships, citizens would be forced to
voice their opinions through the electoral process. Controlled by citizens through the electoral process, the government would be free to
make rational decisions regarding public development. Whether the
government benefited private interests would not matter.
The biggest problem with this suggestion involves the fears that
gave rise to the constitutional ban on public gifting in the first place.
Recent widespread voter apathy has led to a decrease in voter control
over government. Thus, it is unlikely that citizens would adequately
control public spending by legislators even though the legislature is
the people's agent. It is possible that we would revert to the lending
182. See Pinsky, supra note 18.
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gone awry situation of late nineteenth century America's railroads.'83
Moreover, given state and municipal legislative bodies' frequent use of
emergency clauses, and the modern Washington Supreme Court's
deference to the legislature, litigation is the only way the electorate can
challenge legislation. The constitutional proscriptions on public
lending to private entities create a cause of action for litigants, despite
the lack of success experienced by challengers in recent litigation.
Eliminating the constitutional provisions would effectively eliminate
all opportunities for citizens to challenge public spending, even if
those challenges often fall on deaf ears.
Another answer may lie in substituting greater procedural protections for constitutional prohibitions. This might encompass implementing a legislative watchdog agency to mandate acceptable publicprivate arrangements, or implementing a referendum review process in
which every potential public-private partnership is put to a public
vote. When combined with greater procedural safeguards, the elimination of the constitutional prohibitions gains credibility. Moreover,
implementing procedural safeguards through legislative enactment as
a substitute to constitutional proscriptions may be a possible avenue of
reform itself.
B. Implement GreaterProceduralSafeguards
At least two possibilities exist that can increase procedural safeguards, whether or not the constitutional ban on the gifting of public
funds is eliminated. The first is creating a legislative or elected agency
to oversee the creation of public-private partnerships.'8 4 This could
perhaps involve an application procedure where both public and private parties to a transaction would have to apply for a permit or license
to enter into a partnership arrangement. The application would then
be subject to review and dismissal if certain citizen-established criteria
were not satisfied. 185
The second possibility is to allow for a citizens' vote on every
application or transaction involving public-private partnerships. Such
a vote could be limited to the citizens directly affected by the partner183. See generally BARKER, supra note 21.
184. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 159-3, -51, -149 (Supp. 1990) (establishing a state-level government agency/commission to review borrowing proposals of municipalities and counties).
185. It also might involve implementing a review process combined with the Open Public
Meetings Act. The Open Public Meetings Act, as codified in WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30 provides that all meetings of a governing body where action is taken be open and accessible to the
public. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30 (1998). Setting up a partnership review process, combined
with the requirements of the Open Public Meetings Act, would ensure public access and
information dissemination on the merits of the proposed partnership arrangement.
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ship. This scenario would be very similar to a school levy or other
local bond measure, allowing citizens an active opportunity to voice
their opposition to, or support for, a public-private transaction that
directly affects them."s6
The problem with the first suggestion is that it sacrifices efficiency. Citizens of an elected representational government expect
their representatives to make such decisions for them. Forcing the
creation of another administrative agency could potentially cost more
in terms of efficiency than it would be worth. Moreover, this option
would not eliminate the substantive legal mechanisms used to uphold
the constitutionality of transactions in the CLEAN cases. If an oversight agency found a public-private transaction valid while citizens did
not, the citizens would be barred from challenging the transaction due
to the same substantive legal mechanisms used in the CLEAN cases to
circumvent Washington's constitution. Because of the court's current
deference to the legislature, the creation of a legislative oversight
agency would do little to bolster citizen input on governmental
decisions.
Similarly, forcing the citizenry to vote on every public-private
arrangement would strip legislatures and local city councils of their
authority to perform functions they are constitutionally required to
perform. The sheer number of potential public-private partnerships
that would proliferate if this system were created could create enormous inefficiencies in government administration, as government and
private entities would be forced to begin campaigns for their partnership arrangements. Special interest lobbying groups for both private
industry and the government would lead campaigns for their particular development project. Such delegation of power to private hands
might lead to abuses of power, or at least a great potential for campaign abuse.
Still, the challengers of recent public-private partnerships have
illustrated through their litigation that the lack of process and the
accountability of political leaders cause the most concern. In creating
a procedure by which citizens could voice their political opinions, the
above suggested procedural protections could make people feel better
about a substantive result with which they ultimately may disagree.
Democracy is premised on the exercise of political voice, and would be
186. Perhaps in response to the widespread voter dissatisfaction after CLEAN v. State, the
Washington Legislature recently adopted this proposal, allowing the voters to voice their approval on the construction of a new stadium for the Seattle Seahawks. While the stadium
referendum passed by a margin of 51%, the Legislature still utilized an emergency clause in its
legislation, prompting a challenge which was defeated at the Washington Supreme Court level.
See Brower v. State, 137 Wash. 2d 44, 969 P.2d 42 (1998).
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better served as to public-private partnerships if the people were given
a voice through enacted procedural safeguards.
Furthermore, if a legislative agency were elected or the people
had the opportunity to accept or reject specific public-private partnership arrangements, the people would have a right to be heard, a situation that does not seem to exist currently if the Seattle Nordstrom's
parking garage project is any indication. If public-private partnerships
are here to stay because of the erosion of Washington's constitutional
proscriptions against them, then greater protection for the citizens
affected by them is required. The next section explores another
option that embraces partnerships but limits their function.
C. Accept Public-PrivatePartnershipsbut Limit Their Use
A third possibility to better define the role of public-private
partnerships is to legislatively acknowledge a limited use of publicprivate partnerships for clearly defined public concerns. This could
be accomplished by limiting the types of private entities with which
governments could enter into arrangements."8 7 This option might be
combined with either or both of the previous suggestions. It could
also stand as an independent option for reform.
Given that public-private partnerships provide economic and
social benefit to the areas that they affect, this suggestion is the most
pragmatic. Such a limitation could be defined by projects that involve
traditional functions of government activity, such as public works
projects. Under this scenario, public funds could be legally permitted
to benefit private entities so long as the public funds were used to
build roads, sewers, or municipal health buildings instead of financing
parking garages and baseball stadiums.
The biggest problem with this method of reform is that the
court's use of substantive legal mechanisms, such as incidental private
benefit and public purpose analysis, can easily escape any prohibitions
against entering into proscribed types of relationships. For example,
assume that it were forbidden for a governmental unit to enter into an
agreement with a private entity to build a parking garage because it is
not a traditional governmental function. The construction of a parking garage could likely still be upheld as constitutional if the argument
for its construction were framed as serving a public purpose that is
rationally related to the government, while only incidentally benefiting
a private entity. Even by creating specifically proscribed types of public-private relationships, the public would still be faced with the same
187. See Robin Paul Malloy, The PoliticalEconomy of Co-FinancingAmerica's Urban Renaissance,40 VAND. L. REV. 67, 128 (1987).
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obstacles in CLEAN v. State and CLEAN v. Spokane if the publicprivate development were challenged.
The ultimate success of this avenue of reform would depend on
educating the legislature on the constitutional limitations of the gifting
of funds. Success would also depend on the judiciary, as the judiciary
consistently grants deference to the legislature. Thus, to be successful,
the judiciary would have to rework all of the substantive legal mechanisms currently used to circumvent the constitution, and play a more
active role as a constitutional watchdog. Considering that the judiciary has spent the greater part of a century carving out exceptions to
Washington's constitution, it is unlikely that discarding precedent
would be so easily accomplished.
D. Adopt a CorporateModel
A fourth and possibly better solution to the role of public-private
partnerships combines some of the aspects of the three previous suggestions by legislatively structuring public-private partnerships on a
corporate model."' 8 After all, the partnerships already use municipal
corporations as tools to circumvent the constitution. Why not treat
the public-private relationship as a corporation itself, viewing the citizenry as shareholders, and the state or local officials, combined with
their private partners, as directors or officers? Corporations operate to
achieve maximum profit for their shareholders. A municipality or
local government should operate to achieve maximum benefit to its
citizens.
Furthermore, corporations are required to follow specific procedures, such as registering with state authorities and disclosing full
financial information. The registration and disclosure requirements
would provide greater state control, greater public input, and greater
communication of information to the public. Unfortunately, this type
of control mechanism is absent from recent discourse surrounding
public-private partnerships.
As directors are elected by the shareholders and are directly
accountable to them for profits and transgressions, a model based on
corporate law would ensure the shareholding public the right to vote
for their directors (partnerships). 9 Similarly, just as corporate direc188. For an excellent overview of the modern corporation see WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN
C. COFFEE, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE (1996). Although not as flexible as a
partnership, a corporate model would better ensure the public's control of a public-private relationship because of the disclosure and regulatory requirements imposed upon corporations.
189. This model would ensure the public's right to vote on the directors at the corporation's inception. The Model Business Code adopted by Washington currently allows the incorporators to choose directors in the articles of incorporation given to the Secretary of State. See
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tors are required to give full disclosure of all transactions affecting the
financial viability of their companies, structuring public-private partnerships on a corporate model would encourage full disclosure by city
or state officials to their citizen shareholders. Nondisclosure, such as
that which occurred in the Pacific Place parking garage deal, would
invite lawsuits for breach of duty against the city or state implementing the directives.
The drawback to structuring public-private partnerships on a
model of corporate accountability is that it would be very difficult to
implement, and even more difficult to sell to either the public or the
government. Implementing a corporate structure would involve the
creation of a larger bureaucracy and perhaps increase costs to the taxpaying public. 9 °
This raises a question of how to run the corporations? One
possibility would be to implement licensing qualification programs
under which public-private partnerships must register with the state
like a corporation. This would ensure oversight into the affairs of the
partnerships. While this might prevent the use of HUD loans to
finance shopping mall parking garages, the increased bureaucracy
might also discourage private entities from wanting any dealings with
the government. 191
However, the chief benefit of using corporate law as a model is
that it would eliminate the substantive legal devices used to circumvent constitutional provisions. If the shareholding public did not
authorize the formation of the corporation's existence, it would not
exist. Whether or not a model for public-private partnerships is used
is insignificant to the reform that is definitely needed in the area of
legislative emergency clauses.
E. Eliminate or Better Define Emergency Clauses
Emergency clauses have been a boon to the development of public-private partnerships. As the CLEAN cases show, a legislative
declaration of emergency virtually eliminates public legal challenge to
WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.02.020 (1998).
190. Implementing a corporate model could prove very costly to the public in the long run,
as any legal defense by the "corporation" would likely be paid out of public coffers with taxpayer
(shareholder) money.
191. An additional caveat necessary for successful implementation of this scenario would
be to require the weakening or disclaiming of the business judgment rule, which protects directors from liability by giving them almost unlimited corporate discretion relating to business
affairs. See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 188. If the business judgment rule were not eliminated with respect to public-private partnerships, then the partnerships would be free to enter
into agreements under their own terms, free from citizen control, as is currently happening in
Washington.
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the legislation. Arguably, this is inconsistent with the goals of the referendum and democratic processes. Indeed, the police power of the
state is sacrosanct, but so is the citizens' right to referendum under the
Washington Constitution. The successful implementation of any of
the previous suggestions for reform necessitates strong legislative and
judicial reform.
One option for reform is to define in clear and unequivocal language what constitutes an emergency. Another option is to prevent an
emergency clause from inclusion in public-private partnership legislation. While complete removal of legislative emergency clauses is an
additional option, it is unrealistic to argue for their complete elimination. An actual need for the emergency clause exists in true emergencies such as war, plague, severe economic depression, or social unrest.
Defining what constitutes an emergency for purposes of emergency clauses and limiting the use of the clauses any time a public-private partnership is involved would invoke much legislative wrangling.
Emergency clauses could easily be enacted for situations of true emergency such as natural disaster, war, or truly severe market depression.
Threats of the Mariners leaving town or Nordstrom not setting up
shop in a newly refurbished mall would not qualify as emergencies,
and the people would therefore be allowed to voice their opinion
through the constitutionally protected referendum process, as the referendum process was designed to function. The elimination of emergency clauses in public-private legislation would also ensure the
citizens their right to referendum.
Unfortunately, whether the legislature would be bold enough to
limit the use of a clause with which it has had so much political success is questionable. In addition, whether the judiciary would be bold
enough to stop deferring to the legislature on issues of emergency
when those issues are clearly not emergencies is similarly questionable.
Ultimately, it is the taxpaying public that suffers from both the
legislature's abuse of emergency clauses and the judiciary's consistent
deference to the legislature.
V. CONCLUSION

This Comment has explored the relationship of public and private interests in economic development through an analysis of mechanisms used by recent public-private partnerships to achieve economic
development. Beginning in Part II, this Comment analyzed the historical development of Washington's constitutional prohibitions on
the public gifting or lending of funds to private entities. As the economy grew throughout the beginning and middle parts of this century,
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so did the need for increased public-private economic ventures.
Part II also highlighted how the Washington Supreme Court
responded to this increased need by carving out exceptions to the constitutional prohibitions. In recent years, these prohibitions have been
all but nullified by the judiciary's consistent use of substantive legal
mechanisms to circumvent the constitution while continuing to promote public-private arrangements. The most recent manifestations of
this constitutional erosion were evidenced in Part III by an examination of three Washington public-private partnership developments:
Safeco Field in Seattle, the River Park Square parking garage in Spokane, and the Pacific Place parking garage development in Seattle.
These case studies show that the use of substantive legal mechanisms by state and local governments, in conjunction with judicial
interpretation, precluded the public from obtaining information
regarding how their tax moneys were spent, denied the public a right
to participate in public spending decisions that affected them, and
severely impinged on the public's constitutional right to referendum.
The end result of public-private use of these devices precludes the
public's voice in affairs of their own communities, and fosters an
atmosphere of mistrust between citizens and their elected representatives. Part IV provided suggestions for possible areas of reform for
public-private partnerships, and how both the legislature and judiciary
could achieve these reforms.
Ultimately, public-private partnerships are here to stay and
should be embraced as a beneficial tool of economic development.
However, if their viability is to continue, reforms such as those outlined in Part III should be considered.

